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ABSTRACT 
 This report focuses on documenting the process and results of efforts made to use light 
weight encryption to secure the Controller Area Network (CAN) in automotive vehicles. As 
vehicles have become more complex they have opened the CAN to a multitude of different attacks. 
These attacks range from simple malfunctioning hardware to attacks across vehicle to vehicle 
communication. These new opportunities for attack have created a need in the automotive world 
for an easily implementable and cheap security option for the CAN.  
This project focused on using light weight encryption to secure the network by allowing 
for message verification which mitigates many different types of network attacks. To evaluate the 
effectiveness of the encryption a test bench was created using the CAN harness from a 2015 Chevy 
Impala. This contained four microcontrollers, or Electrical Control Units (ECU), to emulate the 
behavior of a vehicle’s CAN. The test bench allowed for the development of message verification 
using Secure Hashing Algorithms (SHA). A Graphical User Interface was also developed to track 
messages being sent across the CAN, and to compare how many attacks on the system have been 
prevented. The results of this project support the idea that using simple cryptography both message 
ID spoofing attacks and timing-based attacks can be mitigated. Additionally, through a series of 
performance tests with specific controls for the test set it was determined that the use of simple 
cryptography did not impact the systems performance. This report contains the information 
regarding the CAN, ECUs, SHA and the methodology used to develop and test a secure network 
using these resources.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 Automotive vehicles are going through a technological change as microcontrollers and 
real-time devices have become more available. More automotive vehicles than ever before have 
complex systems that allow for internet connection and vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication. 
While these advancements have opened many doors for the development of new features in cars 
ranging from safety to convenience, they also allow for more potential attacks as the systems get 
ever more complicated. The CAN is a main communication standard in automotive vehicles that 
has increased its complexity with each new electrical system added to a vehicle. The importance 
of studying ways to secure the CAN system in vehicles is important to prevent the manipulation 
of vehicle data and ensure that critical safety features are not compromised. The proposed approach 
of using light-weight encryption to implement message verification allows for existing system 
designs to be more secure without the cost of adding additional hardware in a production line.  
 The goal of this project was to implement a light-weight cryptographic method that would 
allow for the mitigation of multiple types of attacks across the CAN system. The attacks included 
message ID spoofing and a bit copying message timing attack. These attacks were chosen because 
they are the most common attacks that happen on communication networks and can have large 
impacts on the performance of vehicles if left unmitigated. Once the attacks to mitigate were 
chosen the success of mitigating those attacks needed to be measured in a test bed that replicated 
the behavior of a vehicles CAN system. This replication of CAN behavior was created using a 
complete CAN harness from a working vehicle and the implementation of multiple 
microcontrollers that would send and receive messages. The visualization of this project was a key 
xv 
 
aspect in determining the effectiveness of the study. These project goals would allow for the 
development of a mitigation solution that has been thoroughly vetted.  
 To achieve these goals the project was broken down into multiple milestones that needed 
to be completed to ensure each stage of the project was correct. The first major milestone for this 
project was to complete the functional programming of a simple CAN network using 
microcontrollers to create behavioral attacks on the simple network. The next stage of this project 
was to implement an encryption method that would allow for message verification. Finally, the 
implementation of software devices onto a real CAN harness and the use of a Graphical User 
Interface showed that the implemented system does ensure that attacks are mitigated. 
 Each milestone of this project was successful with only minor changes to the projected 
timeline. The implementation of microcontrollers was quickly sped along by MITRE Cooperation 
providing use with Teensy controllers that rested on pre-spun boards with useful materials such as 
the MCP2551 CAN transceiver and a multitude of user interface devices. This added help greatly 
sped up the process of reaching a point of implementing programmable controllers. The project 
goal of creating a simple CAN network was implemented quickly with the use of open source 
Arduino libraries, the provided hardware, and a series of trouble shooting sessions. The next goal 
that was met was the implementation of SHA1 and SHA256 as light weight encryption methods 
for message verification. Implementing attacks was done by creating a controller that copied a 
message bit for bit and then sent the message after a time delay and creating a controller that sent 
a message with either incorrect data or an incorrect message ID. These attacks were shown to be 
mitigated on a full CAN harness with multiple controllers creating network behavior. Finally, a 
xvi 
 
Graphical User Interface was implemented using Python that allowed for transparency in the 
electrical system. 
  The following images display the proof of results, both by verifying the CAN messages 
being sent and showing the performance impact on the CAN system. The first success for the 
development of the results was the completion of a simple CAN system that could send one 
message from one ECU to another. The following image, Figure 1, shows the successful 
transmission of a CAN High and CAN Low message as a real-time signal.  
 
Figure 1: Image of Successful CAN message being sent across the CAN High (Blue) and CAN 
Low (Yellow) signals. The message was sent across 20 Gauge wire and wass captured using an 
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oscilloscope. CAN High and CAN Low are opposite waveforms, as CAN High is pulled to a plus 
3.3 Volts and CAN low is pulled to ground  
 The next step was to create a system that handed messages from one ECU to the next 
ECU, and then responded. The following image, Figure 2, displays how the ECUs in a system 
created a real-time environment that handed multiple messages across the CAN system 
successively. 
 
Figure 2: Multiple CAN Message System Displayed signals in real time, CAN High (Blue) and 
CAN Low (Yellow) show matching waveforms and are sent at regular timing intervals 
 The results of this project show that implementing low cost light-weight encryption 
methods is possible on a vehicle’s CAN system. While the project has yielded good results in 
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mitigating the implemented attacks more work can be done to further verify the usefulness of light-
weight encryption. The future work for this project should focus on the development of more 
robust CAN behavior with a multitude of controllers emulating different systems in a vehicle. The 
continued investigation into different implemented attacks will provide a test bench that can 
anticipate more problem scenarios. Finally, the implementation of more encryption methods will 
allow a comparison that will help find the most effective and secure message verification process.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 According to the US Department of Transportation (Federal Highway Administration), 
there was an estimated 268 million cars in the U.S in the year 2016 which is about 1.8 million 
more than there was in 2010 [1]. Additionally, Figure 3 shows that the total number of cars keeps 
increasing from year to year. With this increase, vehicles also continue evolving with new 
technologies. These changes have allowed for the continued changes to cars in the various ways it 
communicates: vehicle-to-vehicle, vehicle-on-infrastructure, vehicle-to-internet and 
communication with external devices like smartphones and tablets. These forms of vehicular 
communication are carried out using network technologies such as Local Interconnect Network 
(LIN), Control Area Network (CAN), FlexRay and Local Interconnect Network (LIN). CAN is 
popular for medium speed applications, FlexRay is used in high speed applications, and LIN is 
mostly used in low speed applications [2]. However, these technologies are vulnerable to security 
issues that can threaten the networking systems, the vehicle and the vehicle’s safety. 
Figure 3: Number of vehicles registered in the United States from 1990 to 2016 (in 1,000s). 
Graph shows an increasing pattern in the number of cars which is projected to increase. 
2 
 
CAN is the most widely used form of communication technology in vehicles [3]. It was 
developed by Bosch as a “multi-master, message broadcast system that specifies a maximum 
signaling rate of 1 megabit per second (bps)” [4]. Additionally, CAN is a serial communications 
bus defined by the International Standardization Organization (ISO) that was originally introduced 
to the automotive industry so that wiring harnesses can be replaced with a two-wire bus [5]. 
Although CAN bus can transmit and receive messages between their controllers, or Electronic 
Control Units (ECUs), with fault confinement and error containment, such as error detection, error 
signaling and self-monitoring, it still is vulnerable to security threats [6]. Studies have shown that 
accessing a single node on the network can allow the vehicular network to be compromised [7].  
Imagine your vehicle braking while you are stepping on the accelerator on the highway 
due to someone hijacking the CAN system of your vehicle. Imagine that your windows roll down 
when you step on the brakes instead of your car stopping. These are just some unfortunate events 
that could happen if the CAN in vehicles is compromised [8] [9] [10]. Hence, there is an increasing 
research into ways to make it more secure with better performance. Vehicular CAN system can be 
compromised either wirelessly or through direct contact with the vehicle system [6]. Many 
researchers have demonstrated attacks that proves that one can gain access to a vehicle’s internal 
communication system [11]. With the increase in wireless connectivity, wireless attacks on the 
CAN could very soon be on the increase. Attacks through direct contact with the system may be 
unintentional on the part of the driver which makes it even more dangerous. A driver may buy a 
car accessory which may cause the system to be compromised once it is installed in the vehicle. 
There is also the potential of an attacker installing a hardware device in the vehicle to affect the 
correct functioning of the CAN system.   
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 The purpose of this project was to find means of implementing security for the CAN that 
is used in vehicles. ECUs are the main devices used in the CAN system of most modern vehicles. 
To make CAN in vehicles more secure, the functionality of the ECU was analyzed to see if it could 
be altered so that it is able to either accept or reject messages being transmitted. Since the CAN 
should respond as quickly as possible, the most optimized algorithm was sought so that the 
response time of the ECUs will not be drastically affected. 
 This project had a series of challenges faced when attempting to create the secure CAN 
network. The fist challenged faced on this project was a lack of proper documentation for hardware 
provided to the team for both an ECU and a CAN Harness. The lack of documentation delayed the 
project goals and development slightly past what was initially proposed. Additionally, challenges 
were faced when first trying to implement a simple CAN system. At first the setup of the 
terminating resistors in the CAN system caused some problems with the expected digital 
waveform. Additionally, the team experienced problems implementing the Flexcan library from 
TeachOP because the programming platform already had a Flexcan library defined [12]. While the 
project had challenges and setbacks the results show that these challenges did not impede the 
creation of a secure CAN system. 
 The results of this project indicate that the use of cryptographic methods is capable of 
mitigating network level attacks on the CAN network. Specifically, the project was able to develop 
a test bed that implemented ECUs throughout a physical CAN harness and used Secure Hashing 
Algorithms (SHA) to develop a message verification procedure on the CAN network. This 
verification process was able to stop ID spoofing attacks and time delayed attacks. After running 
a series of tests to determine the behavior of the network under an attack using SHA it was 
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necessary to measure the impact of using this message verification process. After running the 
performance test, it was determined that the use SHA in the system had little to now performance 
impact on the system. It was also determined that in a system that was under attack the use of SHA 
improved the performance of the system, allowing less time to be spent processing faulty 
messages. Over all the use of SHA as a message verification process promises to be a useful tool 
in the automotive security environment.  
 This report describes our approach to implementing cryptographic hash functions to secure 
the CAN bus. Chapter 2 of this report provides an overview of the CAN bus, its ECUs and their 
networking functionalities. This chapter also explains cryptographic methods that could be 
implemented to provide security on the CAN. Chapter 3 defines how we determined the final 
design for our approach to implementing a security algorithm on the CAN and ECUs. Chapter 4 
describes the implementation of this proposal. The results of the implementation, conclusions and 
suggestions for other research areas that could be explored in the future are discussed in Chapter 
5. 
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CHAPTER 2: Overview of ECUs and Cryptography 
 This chapter gives insight into what ECUs and the CAN System are and how they create 
an in-vehicle network that controls different functions. In addition, the two main types of message 
security or encryption in cryptography, traditional methods such as RSA and DSA and lightweight 
methods such as PRNG and Hash Functions are also compared and discussed in this chapter.   
2.1 In-Vehicle Network: CAN Bus System and ECUs 
 
The CAN system is the most widely used bus standard for vehicular communication 
technology. It allows a way of connecting the digital systems, which includes controls, actuators, 
and other nodes, in real-time programs within a vehicle for effective communication [13]. Figure 
4 shows a diagram of the basic wiring of a two-wire (high and low) and half-duplex CAN system 
with different nodes, or ECUs [5]. 
 
Figure 4: Basic CAN System: ECUs are wired together from high end to low end in a circuit 
with 120 Ohm resistors on either end. 
The CAN bus system is a network for ECUs allowing them to send and receive messages. 
It is a “serial networking technology for embedded solutions” and allows the use of high levels of 
security for protection [5].  The CAN system is real-time and has a baud rate of 1 Mb/s. 
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Additionally, messages are sent by priority where a node with a lower message ID has a higher 
priority.  
Figure 5 displays the ECUs and gateways (which connect to other buses and wireless 
access) within an in-vehicle network. The CAN bus is connected to other in-vehicle systems that 
can include the Local Interconnect Network (LIN) and FlexRay. The On-Board Diagnostics 
(OBD-II) port allows users to read and write data and install software to the ECUs. Additionally, 
the CAN bus enhances the OBD-II system by reducing wiring requirements and implementing fast 
and more efficient communication between data bus [13]. 
 
Figure 5: CAN System within a Vehicle: The CAN System contains ECUs and Gateways that are 
in network with the rest of the vehicles network which include the LIN Network, MOST network 
and Flex Ray network. 
 
CAN communications data follows the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model [13]. 
The CAN System specification is divided into different layers which include: object layer, transfer 
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layer, and physical layer. The object layer filters messages and statuses. The transfer layer carries 
out transfer protocols such as fault confinement; error detection and signaling; message validation; 
transfer rate and timing; and more. The physical layer handles actual transfer of the bits between 
the different mediums through signal level and bit representation [14] and the communication 
between ECUs within a CAN system uses this specification. Figure 6 shows the different layers 
and the function of each layer for the CAN System specification.  
 
Figure 6: Layers of CAN System Specification: The CAN System has an Application Layer, an 
Object Layer, a Transfer Layer and a Physical Layer that are all required within the network. 
 ECUs are microcontrollers that require real-time data transmission and information 
collection and processing. Modern luxury cars contain about 70 ECUs with up to 2,500 messages 
transferred between them [13]. The microcontrollers used within a CAN system can be 
programmed for communication using the following platforms: Arduino, Teensyduino, Raspberry 
Pi, and Intel Galileo.  
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The Arduino platform is widely used and low in cost. It is efficient and readily available 
for use with many libraries. However, its weaknesses include execution speed, memory resources, 
and it has a low tolerance for data traffic. Teensyduino shares the same properties as Arduino but 
is also compatible with Teensy controllers that contain Teensy ports. The Raspberry Pi platform 
is also readily available and low in cost. It is easy to use with an extensive library and is efficient 
with more RAM and storage compared to other microcontrollers. The Intel Galileo, also 
compatible with the Arduino platform, is more for industrial use and “expand[s] native usage and 
capabilities beyond the Arduino shield ecosystem” [5]. It is more expensive compared to the other 
platforms mentioned in this section and is not compatible with all boards. However, it is easy to 
use with a high-level library.  
The microcontrollers that can be used for the ECUs in the CAN system include the 
MCP2551, MIKROE-2228, ADM00617 or a controller integrated with Teensy.  The MCP2551 
requires an integrated transceiver and is compatible with the Arduino, Raspberry Pi, and Intel 
Galileo platforms. It comes with Arduino CAN Shields, which are needed when setting up a CAN 
network with ECUs. It has an SPI interface and its average cost is $2.50. The MIKROE-2228 
controller interfaces immediately with Arduino. It is a controller integrated with Arduino Shield 1 
and costs $24.00 per unit. ADM00617 is also a controller integrated with Arduino Shield and 
interfaces immediately with Arduino. However, it costs $40.00 per unit. The Teensy integrated 
controller is of no cost because it can be obtained from MITRE. The controller of it is connected 
to Teensy. Table 1 below provides information on each of the CAN controllers. 
9 
 
Table 1: Comparison of four CAN controllers that can be used for the ECUs, which are the 
MCP2551 controller, the MIKROE-2228 controller, the ADM00617 controller, and the Teensy-
integrated controller. All of them are compatible with Arduino. 
Controller Controller 
integrated with 
Arduino CAN 
Shields 
Controller 
integrated with 
Arduino Shield 1 
Controller 
integrated with 
Arduino Shield 2 
Teensy 
integrated 
controller 
Part ID MCP2551 MIKROE-2228 ADM00617 N/A 
Cost $2.50 per unit $24.00 per unit $40.00 per unit Free 
Setup Requires 
integrated 
transceiver 
Controller 
integrated with 
Arduino Shield 1 
Controller 
integrated with 
Arduino Shield 2 
Controller 
integrated with 
Teensy 
Interface SPI Interface with 
Arduino, Intel 
Galileo or 
Raspberry Pi 
Arduino Arduino Arduino and 
Teensyduino 
Resources Technical Data 
Sheet 
Technical Data 
Sheet and 
Company Support 
Technical Data 
Sheet, Application 
examples and 
paper, extensive 
Company Support 
Source codes and 
libraries, 
Technical Data 
and extensive 
Company Support 
[MITRE] 
 
 The CAN bus system is vulnerable to security issues. ECUs can be attacked to allow a 
hacker to take control of the ECU and the in-vehicle network. These attacks can occur through 
different points which include the OBD-II Port and wireless communication protocols [6]. The 
OBD-II Port allows access to all the ECUs within the in-vehicle system. Wireless access includes 
weak security implementations within keyless entry systems and other modes of wireless access. 
However, there are measures that can be taken to mitigate these attacks. 
2.2 Cryptography: Mitigation of Attacks 
 
Types of attacks on the CAN bus system include man-in-the-middle attack, data 
interception, timing-based attacks and message spoofing attacks. These attacks can be mitigated 
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using traditional as well as lightweight cryptographic methods for security. Common examples of 
traditional cryptographic methods are Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) and Digital Signature 
Algorithm (DSA). Both RSA and DSA are also public-key cryptography methods, which means 
they require asymmetric algorithms for encryption [15]. Hash functions, Pseudorandom Number 
Generator (PRNG), Butterfly and Light Encryption Device (LED) are examples of lightweight 
cryptographic methods. These methods are public-key cryptography methods as well, but they are 
lighter and require less resources to run and implement, but still have almost the same quality of 
security, specifically for low power applications [16]. To find out which one of these two to use, 
it was necessary to compare them. This comparison was done in terms of cost, complexity of 
implementation, platform, performance and availability of resources as shown in Table 2. 
Table 2: Comparison of Traditional Cryptography and Lightweight Cryptography based on 
cost/resource requirement, complexity of implementation, performance, platforms on which they 
can be implemented and the availability of resources to help implementation. 
Category/Type Traditional Lightweight 
Cost/Resource requirement 
of platforms 
High Low 
Complexity High Low 
Platforms Servers/desktops, tablets and 
smartphones 
Embedded devices, RFID and 
sensor Networks 
Performance High High 
Availability of Resources Many years of resources and 
research papers available 
IoT provides lots of resources 
and case studies. 
 
Cost refers to the resource requirements that must be met to implement the algorithm as far 
as cryptography is concerned [17]. Examples of these resources in hardware implementations are 
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gate area, gate equivalents, or logic blocks while register, ROM and RAM usage are example of 
software resources. An implementation of the traditional cryptographic methods requires more of 
these resources than lightweight cryptographic methods. Traditional cryptography focuses on 
providing high levels of security without really considering the resource requirements [18]. Hence, 
traditional cryptography is costlier than lightweight cryptography. 
A traditional cryptographic method, such as RSA and DSA, uses complex operations 
through asymmetric algorithms, making it difficult for unauthorized users to have access to the 
keys [9]. It is due to this that traditional cryptographic algorithms require more resources as stated 
above and become “more demanding in terms of computing power” [16]. The complexity of its 
operations and algorithm makes it computationally expensive and means the encryption will 
require many rounds to encrypt [19]. However, traditional public-key cryptography methods are 
very secure and are still used in most modern technologies and applications.  Thus, lightweight 
cryptographic methods are introduced because require a less resources and computing power 
demand by requiring less complex operations while still providing the public-key secure 
encryption. It should be noted that although a less complex may mean compromising the integrity 
of security, there is continued research on lightweight cryptography from the academic community 
to make it better and produce more efficient algorithms.  For example, the Secure Hash Algorithm 
has many different renditions of it which is the result of improvement upon each one that is 
breached. Like most modern technologies and applications, it is being updated every day. 
The traditional cryptographic methods, due to their complexity and resource requirements 
are mostly used on servers, desktops, tablets and mobile phones. Each of these platforms have, to 
some extent, the ability to handle complex algorithms and will perform better compared to a 
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platform such as a microcontroller which has limited resources, such as low power to the 
controller. To be able to implement security on platforms or devices such as embedded systems, 
microcontrollers, RFIDs, and sensor networks, lightweight cryptography is used. This type of 
cryptography method uses less resources but has good performance because it uses the resources 
efficiently. 
In cryptography, there is a tradeoff between performance and amount of resources needed. 
Most of the time, the amount of resources required may be reduced to have greater performance 
[20]. Since the traditional cryptographic methods are used on different platforms (which have more 
resources) than lightweight cryptography, they both perform very well on their respective 
platforms. If traditional cryptography were used on the platforms that require lightweight 
cryptography, such as a microcontroller, there will be an issue of performance because the platform 
is resource constrained. For example, such a platform would not have the required processing 
power to process all the complex algorithms that the traditional cryptography uses. On the other 
hand, using lightweight cryptography for platform that requires traditional cryptography such as a 
server will lead to a compromise of the desired integrity [19].   
The final comparison done involved the availability of existing resources, such as source 
code and algorithms that will aid in implementing the cryptographic method. Since traditional 
cryptographic methods have been around for years now, there have been many years of research 
into it. Lightweight cryptography is more new than traditional cryptography and does not have as 
much research, but there is also a wide range of resources out there. 
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2.3 Chapter Summary 
 
 In this chapter, the CAN system and the ECUs within the network were explored. 
Essentially, the CAN system is a network that wires and connects ECUs, allowing them to send 
and receive messages. The controllers require real-time data transmission and information 
collection and processing. Controllers were also compared based on cost, setup, interfacing and 
resources required. ECUs need to be programmed using a development platform or testbed. These 
interfacing platforms include Intel Galileo, Raspberry Pi and Arduino. 
 This chapter also discussed the potential hazards to a CAN system and its ECUs Two 
cryptographic methods were considered: the traditional methods and lightweight methods. They 
are both public-key methods of encryption, but traditional cryptographic methods are geared 
towards devices or platforms that require a lot more resources and demand in computing power 
due to the complex asymmetric algorithm. Lightweight cryptographic methods are used for 
resource constrained devices or platforms, such as microcontrollers, because they reduce the 
complexity of asymmetric algorithms.  
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CHAPTER 3: PROPOSED APPROACH  
 This chapter proposes the implementation of a replica of the CAN system in a vehicle and 
adding a cryptographic algorithm that will provide security of the network. The ECUs on the CAN 
system in vehicles are prone to be corrupted through methods such as supply chain attacks or 
through external media that can compromise safety since corrupted non-critical systems have 
access to the CAN. The proposal outlines: The CAN system and its ECUs, attack implemented on 
the system and mitigation methods for those attacks and GUI platforms designed to monitor the 
CAN system, attacks and mitigation of those attacks. Additionally, this chapter shows the timeline 
and Gantt chart for completion of the project.  
3.1 In-Vehicle Network: Proposal for CAN System 
 
The ECUs chosen for our CAN system are the Teensy integrated controllers that were 
provided by MITRE at no cost. No further hardware work would be required besides of connecting 
the controllers because it comes integrated with an ARM controller and Teensy ports. The 
controller interfaces with Arduino and Teensyduino, which is a software add on for Arduino 
development studios that is used to program Teensy integrated controllers. It also utilizes the 
Flexcan library. Additionally, support is easily available from MITRE when working with them. 
Fortunately, there are many open source documentation and libraries to use with Arduino and 
Teensyduino.  
A total of four Teensy controllers will be used and called ECU A, ECU B, ECU C and 
ECU D. Figure 7 below shows the basic circuit design of the CAN system. The ECUs are to be 
connected high end to low end using jumpers. The CAN system and ECUs will connect to the 
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computer and Teensyduino test bed through a micro USB. All programming and cryptography will 
go to the ARM controller of the ECUs. To terminate each ends of the CAN system, a 120 Ohm 
resistor is used on either end. 
 
Figure 7: Proposed CAN System: The CAN System will have four ECUs that are wired high end 
to low end with 120 Ohm resistors on either end. 
The ECUs will be sending and receiving messages as shown in Figure 8. ECU A will be sending 
normal (not spoofed) messages to ECU B. ECU C will be copying and spoofing messages from 
ECU A and sending them to ECU B as well. Finally, ECU D will be copying the messages of ECU 
A and sending it to ECU B without spoofing the messages. Ideally, ECU B will not be able to 
receive spoofed messages in the CAN system due to cryptography that will be targeting the ARM 
processor of the Teensy controller. 
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Figure 8: Proposed ECU Network: Connections between ECU A, ECU B, ECU C and ECU D. 
Arrows indicate direction of messages being sent and received. The red component (ECU C) is 
the controller that is attacked and sends/receives spoofed messages. The blue component (ECU 
B) received normal messages. ECU A and ECU D both receive and send messages to and from 
the testbed. 
3.2 Cryptography: Proposal for Mitigation of Attacks 
 
ECUs within the CAN system are vulnerable to supply chain attacks or attacks through 
external media. Therefore, these attacks must be mitigated to protect the CAN system and the 
vehicle. By using a message verification scheme for the message sent across CAN systems in cars 
we can implement some form of security to mitigate damage from potential intruders. This solution 
could be used against message spoofing and timing-based attacks. To create such a solution, 
traditional and lightweight cryptographic methods were considered as discussed in Chapter 2. Out 
of the two, lightweight cryptography was selected because it is designed to provide security for 
microcontrollers which is what was used to implement the ECUs. Using traditional cryptographic 
methods will require a lot of processing power and a lot of resources which the microcontroller 
does not have. In order words, lightweight cryptography provides efficiency of end-to-end 
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communication in that it allows lower energy consumption for end devices [21]. Hence, 
lightweight cryptography was chosen as the preferred method of ensuring security on the ECUs. 
As stated in Chapter 2, there many types of lightweight cryptography methods. PRNG, 
LED and SHA cryptographic methods were compared to find one that will be convenient to 
implement. These algorithms were compared for their cost, complexity, efficiency and 
implementation as shown in Table 2 below: 
Table 3: Lightweight cryptography methods PRNG, LED and SHA are compared by cost, 
complexity, efficiency and implementation. PRNG and SHA are both free in terms of cost 
compared to LED but are not as efficient as LED. Although, all three methods are less complex 
to implement. 
Category/Type PRNG LED SHA 
Cost Free Price per unit 
varies 
Free 
Complexity Low Low Low 
Efficiency Low High Low 
Implementation Simplistic 
design allows for 
easy decryption. 
Independent 
hardware allows 
for large 
complex 
encryption 
schemes to be 
used. 
Simple 
implementation 
and a lot of open 
source libraries 
available 
 
After consideration of each of these lightweight cryptographic methods, Secure Hash 
Algorithm (SHA) was proposed as the preferred method of implementing security on the ECUs. 
SHA was chosen because it is free, simple to implement and has a lot of open source libraries. It 
was picked over LED mostly because LED is not free although it is somewhat more efficient that 
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SHA, and because LED may involve large complex encryption. SHA was also picked over PRNG 
because it does not require a decryption method. Since the ECUs are supposed to be responding at 
a very fast rate after receiving a message, a decryption stage after receiving the message would 
lead to lagging. SHA was used as a message verification tool so that the expected SHA digest (the 
hashed message) would be hard-coded into the ECU and checked against the message digest of an 
incoming message. This way, when the ECU receives a message, it will only allow the message 
whose digest matches the hard-coded digest in and disallow the message whose digest does not 
match. 
SHA is an algorithm that is computationally infeasible to find a message which corresponds 
to a given message digest. It is also almost impossible for two different messages to have the same 
digest [22]. This occurrence is called collision attack and to achieve this will require a lot of work 
and machines with huge computational power. In 2007, CWI Amsterdam and Google successfully 
performed a collision attack against SHA-1 by publishing two different PDF files which produced 
the same hash. This successful effort required over 9,223,372,036,854,775,808 computations [23]. 
However, SHA-256 has not been compromised yet. 
3.3 Data Analysis: Proposal for GUI 
 
It was proposed that a GUI be designed to visualize and aid in tracking the performance of 
the ECUs, attacks and mitigation methods. The GUI proposed has two main parts and must be 
written in the Python programming language. The first part of the GUI must display message 
transmissions and indicate when an ECU/transmitted message has been corrupted. When the attack 
happens, the mitigation technique will be implemented so that the original message can be 
19 
 
transmitted. The second part of the GUI must have indicators for the type of the message being 
transmitted (whether correct or wrong message). Green will indicate a correct message and red 
will indicate that a wrong message is being transmitted and the ECU is being attacked. These two 
parts of the GUI come together to display the output of CAN interactions, messages between ECUs 
and the status of any ECUs/messages being attacked. 
3.4 Expected Timeline: Gantt Chart 
 
 The project was completed in two academic semesters, from August 24 to May 1. This 
period was divided into four quarters and different goals were set for each quarter. Work on the 
ECUs communicating with each other and the implementation of SHA were mostly completed in 
the first two quarters and designing the GUI and connecting the system to the harness were 
completed in the last two quarters. 
For the first quarter of the two semesters, the first step was to find the best solution to the 
problem at hand. This was done by the entire team after which the solutions obtained were 
discussed and a common one agreed on. The next thing done was to complete implementation of 
communication between at least two ECUs. At this same time, an attempt was made to implement 
a Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) to suit the project.  
In the second quarter, SHA-1 was completely implemented and the implementation of 
SHA-256 was also done. An attempt was also made to add a third ECU to the network. This also 
involved implementing the message spoofing attack. The drafting of the project report was started 
in the quarter.  
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The third ECUs functionality was completed in the third quarter as well as the GUI. The 
harness was also explored and added to the network. After this, extensive testing of the system 
was done. At this same time, the draft of the report was being written.  
In the fourth and final quarter, the fourth ECU was added to the network which means a 
timing-based attack was implemented. The rest of the quarter was dedicated to presentations, 
finishing up the report and writing an IEEE conference paper.     
3.5 Chapter Summary 
 
 The proposal for the In-Vehicle Cyber Security project is to use SHA to provide some form 
of security for the CAN in vehicles. This will be done by hashing the messages that are passed 
along the CAN so that their message digests will be compared to a hard-coded expected message 
digest. The two types of SHA that will be used are SHA-1 and SHA-256 and it was expected that 
this solution would be used against message spoofing attacks and timing-based attacks. The 
cryptographic method will be implemented in a proposed CAN system that will consist of four 
Teensy integrated controllers that are controlled though an Arduino and Teensyduino testbed. A 
GUI was also proposed to be created and used to monitor the ECUs and the messages being sent. 
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CHAPTER 4: IMPLEMENTATION AND METHODOLOGY 
 This chapter details the method used to complete the goals in the proposed approach and 
discuss technical details of how the project was implemented. The methodology was broken down 
into six distinct steps each one with specific process details on how the steps were implemented. 
The first step of the project was designing the Hardware and Software requirements for encrypting 
a CAN system which lead nicely into the development of a simple CAN system. The next process 
that was completed in this project was the development of the ECU’s behaviors, including the 
ability to implement and mitigate different types of attacks. To complete the behavior of each ECU 
the encryption methods of SHA-1 and SHA-256 were implemented to allow for attack mitigation. 
The last steps of this project were to create a complex CAN system on a vehicle’s CAN harness, 
which involved extensive research and troubleshooting processes, and the development of a GUI 
so that the results of the project could be easily visualized. 
4.1 Software and Hardware 
 
To set up and implement our CAN system and mitigation methods, the controllers need to 
be acquired and set up with the appropriate test bed on the computer. The controllers used for the 
project are four Teensy integrated ECUs that are connected from high end to low end with 120 
Ohm resistors on either end. The test bed to be downloaded and used for implementation are the 
Arduino platform and the Teensyduino software add on. All programming and encryption will go 
to the ARM controller of the ECUs. Additionally, all ECU/message transmission and status on 
whether they are being attacked or not will be displayed on the GUI platform on the computer. 
Figure 13 shows the connections between the computer and the CAN systems and the components 
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and network. The gray components which include the GUI, the Arduino and Teensyduino testbed, 
ECU A and ECU D are receiving and/or sending normal messages. The red component, ECU C, 
sends and received spoofed (corrupted) messages and is under attack. The blue component, ECU 
B, receives normal messages from ECU A and ECU D, which send and receive normal messages 
from the testbed. 
 
Figure 13: Block Diagram of Computer connected to CAN System Network: Computer contains 
GUI #1, GUI #2 and the Arduino and Teensyduino testbed; CAN System contains ECU A, ECU 
B, ECU C and ECU D which are programmed and encrypted through their ARM controllers 
4.2 Design Methodology: CAN System 
 
To build the CAN system, ECU A and ECU B were wired together and connected to the 
testbed first and can send and receive messages to each other. Figure 14 displays the preliminary 
stage of the CAN system, which is the connection between ECU A and ECU B. They are wired 
together from high end to low end and are programmed through the ARM controller. ECU A is 
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the only one connected to the computer and ECU B is wired to ECU A. This allows control of 
the preliminary CAN system using the Arduino and Teensyduino testbed.  
 
Figure 14: : Preliminary CAN System: ECU A and ECU B are wired and connected for a 
preliminary network for building the rest of the CAN System (ECU A, ECU B, ECU C and ECU 
D); the LEDs indicate if messages are being sent and received (Rx and Tx LEDs). 
 
To properly implement this preliminary stage of the network and control it, Hristos 
Giannopoulos from MITRE, supplied the libraries that are used to implement the CAN 
communication between at least two Teensy CAN controllers.  
4.3 Design Methodology and Implementation: ECUs 
   
To implement an ECU that properly emulates the behavior of a CAN network a multiple 
chip system was implemented. The controller used in this chip is a Teensyduino with an ARM 
compiler that provided ease of programming by using the Arduino IDE as the development 
platform. The second microchip in this system was a MCP2551 CAN Transceiver, using a five 
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Volt digital logic it is capable of 500 kilobytes per second transfer speed. These two chips and the 
printed circuit board that the chips were built on were provided by the MITRE Corporation. Being 
provided the Chips and board greatly advanced the speed at which an ECU was successfully 
working in the CAN environment. The boards provided by MITRE also had a multitude of user 
interfaces such as potentiometers, switches and light emitting diodes. The final item included on 
the board is an output to standard DB-9 connector that allowed the ECU to connect to the Chevy 
CAN harness. 
 
Figure 15: ECU Layout: ECU contains a potentiometer, LED, Teensy integrated ports, 
MCP2551 controller and a DB-9 port 
 
Once the hardware was setup the next step was to test it by sending simple CAN messages. 
The Flexcan library provided by Teachop quickly allowed for the development of a simple CAN 
network by using the supported CAN library in Arduino for the MCP2551 [20].  Flexcan tied pins 
3 and 4 to RX and TX pins respectively on the MCP2551. The software on the Teensyduino packs 
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a message with a three-byte ID and eight bytes of information. After the message is saved the write 
function provided by Flexcan sends the information to the MCP2551 where it sits in a FIFO buffer 
until the message has a chance to send over CAN based on the message ID [24]. Respectively the 
read function provided by Flexcan allows the Teensyduino to read from the FIFO buffer on the 
MCP2551, returning zero if no value has been saved. Once we had the Teensyduino setup with a 
proper packaged message two of the ECUs were connected to a properly terminating CAN system 
that allowed one ECU to send a message that was received by the second ECU. 
 The next step in development of the behavior of the ECUs was to use an encryption method 
to securely send messages between ECUs. Secure Hashing Algorithm-1 (SHA1) was implemented 
first because it takes up a small portion of programmable memory on the Teensyduino and number 
of instructions was low, so it could be handled by the ARM compiler on the Teensyduino. The 
final product of the SHA1 was a larger message then could be sent across CAN in a single message, 
so the message could not be directly encrypted. Instead a message that is received by an ECU is 
read from the FIFO buffer and the values in the message are used to determine what the message 
ID is and creates a value using SHA-1 that is based started from the predicted message ID and 
message values. An expected message digest which created from an expected message ID and 
message values is hard-coded into the receiving ECU. Comparing the two message digests of 
SHA1 allows the message to be accepted if they match and rejected if they do not match. 
 The next development for the ECUs was to utilize their user interface mechanisms. First 
was to implement the LEDs on the ECU to indicate the type of message received by the ECU. 
Once the pins for each LED on the ECU was verified and saved as static variables the FASTled 
library was used [25]. This allowed the ECU to make the LEDs red when rejecting a message and 
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green when receiving a message. The switches on the ECUs were also implemented by 
determining pins for each switch and then using Arduino interrupts to provide real time response 
when a user clicks the switch [26]. The switch was used to turn on and off the message verification 
system so that an attack could be demonstrated later. 
 The next step in the user display process was to attach to the CAN system a 2008 Rx Mazda 
instrument cluster [27]. This instrument cluster was expecting specific CAN messages with 
specific IDs to be received to display information on different interments such as a speedometer, 
fuel gage, and warning lights. Using open source tutorial and information from AutoZone the 
instrument cluster was determined to receive three can messages, with each bit in each message 
representing a different value to the display instruments [26]. Once the instrument cluster was 
running it provided an exciting way to include observers as to what is happening in the CAN 
system.  
 The next behavior for each ECU was to program the message spoofing and timing-based 
attacks. The message spoofing ECU simply took known values that could be represented and 
attached to the message the incorrect message ID. This message spoofing was prevented from 
sending data to the receiving ECU by the message verification process that utilizes SHA. The next 
development was the ECU with the timing-based attack. This ECU would wait for a message with 
a specific ID and then copy the entire message bit for bit. The message would then be sent out at 
a time delay which allowed it to successfully send messages across our CAN system. To prevent 
this type of attack it was necessary to develop in the SHA function to also check the output by 
adding a global timer variable to the bits being run through SHA. This allowed for any message 
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that was copied and then sent a few seconds later to be filtered out by the message verification 
process as well.  
 The final step for the development of the ECUs was to implement all four onto the CAN 
harness and attempt to run them together in the test bed. This step required the least work because 
of the preparation done before, once connected to the harness a few bits for the message to the 
instrument cluster had to be changed and some timing parameters in each ECU needed to be 
changed to get the full functionality expected of each ECU.  
4.4 Design Modules and Implementations: Encryption Methods 
 
 Two versions of the Secure Hash Algorithm were implemented unto the ECUs: SHA-1 and 
SHA-256. Both algorithms were implemented so that they could be compared to see which one is 
faster and more efficient. SHA was implemented as a message verification algorithm on the ECU 
that was receiving messages from the other three. In this ECU, an expected value for the hashed 
message (message digest) is hard-coded. When the ECU receives a message, it uses this algorithm 
to hash the message and the created message digest is compared with the stored digest to see if it 
is a match. If it is a match, then the message is received and processed by the ECU. If the message 
digest of the hashed message does not match the expected digest, then there has been an attack and 
the message is refused. Figure 16 shows a flow diagram of how an ECU receives or does not 
receive a message depending on whether it is corrupted or not. 
32 
 
 
Figure 16: Flow Diagram of Message sent to an ECU. If the message received is corrupted 
because it does not match the hashed message that is in the stored digest, the message will be 
refused and not processed by the ECU. If the message does match, it will be processed. 
 The Secure Hash Algorithm takes in an input of any length within a range and gives out 
and output of a common length (message digest). Every message that is input in the algorithm will 
produce a totally different message digest, even if it is a single letter that was changed in the 
message.  
2fd4e1c67a2d28fced849ee1bb76e7391b93eb12 
Figure 17: An example of how a single character change results in a drastically different hash.  
Here, the letter q in quick was changed from lower to upper case, and the resulting hashes are 
significantly different.  
The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog 
75906573d69031ad3e12334409ebbfb8be42a543 
The Quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog 
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Figure 17 shows an example of a message and its hash value (SHA-1), and then a similar message 
with just one letter changed and its hash value (SHA-1). As can be seen, a change of a letter from 
lowercase to uppercase changed not just one character in the hash but the entire hash value.  
The Simple Hash Algorithm-1 (SHA-1) is a type of cryptographic hash function that takes 
in an input of any length less than 264 bits and gives an output of 160 bits long called a message 
digest. The Simple Hash Algorithm-256 (SHA-256) on the other hand takes an input of any length 
less than 264 bits and gives an output of 256 bits long. The rendition of SHA-1 and SHA-256 used 
on the ECUs was based on a 2001 implementation of SHA-1 by Eastlake and Jones from Cisco 
systems and an implementation of SHA-256 by Brad Conte respectively. Modifications were made 
to their algorithms to suit the context of this project. The original code implemented just the 
hashing of a given message, but an additional step of converting that hash value to a binary was 
added to make it harder for anyone to predict the hard-coded expected hash value of the receiving 
ECU. Other changes were also made to make the code so that it would receive the type of message 
the ECU would receive. The functionality on the ECU was set up such that the received message 
is just passed through the SHA-1 algorithm and hashed. After this, the message digest is converted 
to binary and compared to the expected message (which is in binary form), and the message is 
either accepted or rejected.  
 The hashing of the message by SHA-1and SHA-256 is done in blocks. Each block of the 
message consists of 512 bits which are represented as a sequence of sixteen 32-bit words. Each 
word is a w-bit string that may be represented as a sequence of hex digits [28]. The algorithm takes 
the first 512 bits of the message, processes it and hashes it and then moves on to the next 512 bits. 
Hence, the length of a message received must be a multiple of 512. If this is not true for the message 
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received, the algorithm pads the message by appending it with a “1”, followed by a number of “0” 
s and then a 64-bit representation of the original length of the message. After the padding of the 
message, it is parsed into an N 512-bit blocks. Each block is processed through hash computations 
using operations such as bitwise logical word operations, addition modulo 2W, right shifting, rotate 
right, and rotate left to produce the message digest. 
4.5 Design Module: Graphical User Interface (GUI) 
 
 A Graphical User Interface (GUI) was designed to visualize the sending and receiving of 
messages by the ECUs. It was designed using Python tkinter, which is Python’s most commonly 
used GUI package [21]. The GUI consists of two main sections as can be seen in Figure 18: the 
first section (left) displays information about messages being transmitted from the sending ECUs 
to the receiving ECU: a history of how many messages each has sent as well how many good and 
bad messages have been received by the receiving ECU. The other section (right) shows a 
historical graph of how many good, bad or no messages that the receiving ECU has received. 
The left section of the GUI consists of the three sending ECUs: B, C and D. Each is 
followed by vertical arrows which show if an ECU sent a message a time or not. After a total of 
forty-eight messages have been sent, these arrows are deleted and recreated based on the new 
messages being received. There is also a counter at the bottom which shows how many good versus 
bad messages that has been received by ECU A. The counts should match the vertical arrows for 
how many messages were sent by ECU B, C and D. A good message means ECU B has sent a 
message and hence, will have a green arrow to indicate with the good messages count incremented 
by one. A bad message means that either ECU C or D has sent a message and will have a red arrow 
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to indicate with the bad messages count incremented by one. In Figure 20, a total of seventeen 
messages have been received. Out of the seventeen, six of them are good messages and eleven are 
bad messages. 
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The right section shown in Figure 21 and 22, which has the graph, has three values for the 
vertical axis (one, zero, and negative one). A value of one means that a correct message has been 
received by ECU A, a value of zero means that no message has been received and a value of 
negative one means that a wrong message has been received.  When the system is not under attack, 
the graph has vertical axis values of either zero or one to represent no message being transmitted 
or a message being transmitted respectively as shown in Figure 21. On the other hand, the graph 
Figure 21 Graph showing ECU A not under attack. As can be observed, the vertical axis has 
values of either 0 or 1 to indicate no message being transmitted and a correct message 
being transmitted. This happens when the message authentication algorithm is activated. 
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has values of either zero, one or negative one when the system is under attack as shown in Figure 
22. The value of negative one means that ECUA is receiving incorrect messages. The horizontal 
axis has intervals that change based on the number of messages that have been received. In other 
words, the horizontal axis increases in interval as more messages are received. 
 
 
Figure 22: Graph showing ECU A under attack because of the absence of a message 
authentication algorithm. It shows values of 0, 1 and -1 for the vertical axis. 
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Below are the cautions to take for the GUI to work correctly with the ECU set up. 
1. Download and install the following python packages: pyserial, matlibplot. 
2. The Teensy should be connected to the computer on which the code for the GUI will be 
compiled and run. 
3. If running both code from teensy and GUI, first run the code for the teensy and then run 
that of the GUI. If you just have the code for the teensy already compiled and loaded to the 
teensy, just plug in the teensy to the computer and compile and run the code for the GUI. 
4. Make sure you set the value of the Communication (COM) port and the baud rates to the 
corresponding values that the teensy uses. The code snippet below shows teensy COM port 
"COM5" and baud rate of 9600. 
ser = serial.Serial('COM5', 9600) 
5. In case you need to copy the code for the GUI to another computer, be sure to copy 
"sampleText.txt" as well and make sure they are in the same directory. If you decide not to 
copy this file, you can also create a text file and replace any reference to "sampleText.txt" 
in the code with the name of the text file you create. 
4.6 The CAN Harness 
Preliminary development and testing of the ECUs was conducted over jumper wires.  
However, the plan was to use a physical CAN harness for final testing.  The electrical wiring 
harness from a 2015 model year Chevy Impala was generously provided to the WPI MITRE 
Collaboratory by MITRE. Additionally, there was an instrument cluster from an unrelated vehicle.  
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For ease of use, the harness was stored attached to a metal grate, which gave some support to the 
otherwise spaghetti like structure.  
Figure 23: Wiring harness from a 2015 Chevy Impala provided by MITRE.  It is 
supported by a metal grate. The harness includes CAN bus connectors for brake 
control, telematics, human machine interfaces, body control, electronic, engine control, 
control solenoid, chassis control, and power steering.  Additionally, there was an 
instrument cluster used for visual indicators in our setup. 
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The CAN harness had been used by previous MQP teams and some of the connectors 
already had paper tags attached [29]. The tag indicated the connector type and what it was 
intended for as seen in Figure 24. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
There were also scans of the CAN bus documentation for a 2014 Chevy Impala electrical 
system [30]. Unfortunately, the documentation did not match the 2015 harness. In some cases, one 
of the labeled connectors would have an entirely different physical shape.  This can be seen with 
the K43 connector intended for power steering in Figure 25. The 2014 model year documentation 
showed a connector with a total of 10 bins arranged in 2 rows, while the connector on the harness 
featured just 5 pins in a single row.  
Figure 24: Connector on the 2015 Chevy Impala wiring harness.  The 
connector has been marked by the previous MQP team with a paper tag 
that identifies it as the K83 connector that is used by the parking brake.  
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There were also other cases where the physical shape of the connector would match that of 
the documentation, but the pinout would not. For example, the K74 Human Machine Interface 
Control Module documentation indicated 16 pins arranged in two rows of eight, which the 
connector on the physical 2015 CAN harness had as shown in Figure 26.  However, the pinout 
does not match.  The documentation indicates that the CAN high is located on pins 11 and 13 and 
CAN low on pins 12 and 14. The physical harness connector does not have anything connected to 
pin 11, so it cannot possibly be CAN low. If we look at just the not connected pins as an indicator 
of discrepancies, we can see a big mismatch between the documentation and the physical harness.  
Some of the not connected pins do line up between the documentation and physical harness, 
but the clear majority of them do not.  In fact, the number of conductors going to the connector 
Figure 25: K43 Power Steering connector in the documentation for a 2014 Chevy 
impala and on the 2015 Harness. The documentation indicates a 10-pin layout in 2 
rows of five, while the connector on the harness only has 5 pins in a single row. 
Figure 26: On the left is the K74 Human Machine Interface Control Module as 
pictured in the 2014 documentation, which has 16 pins in two rows of eight.  On 
the right is the same connector on the 2015 harness. 
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does not even match between the two.  The documentation indicates that there should be 10 
conductors, while the actual harness only has eight conductors connected to it.   
Table 4: Pins that were not connected according to the 2014 documentation and on the 2015 
harness. 
Pin Documentation Harness 
1   
2   
3 Not Occupied Not Occupied 
4 Not Occupied  
5   
6 Not Occupied  
7  Not Occupied 
8  Not Occupied 
9  Not Occupied  
10 Not Occupied Not Occupied  
11  Not Occupied  
12   
13   
14   
15 Not Occupied Not Occupied  
16 Not Occupied Not Occupied 
With the high number of discrepancies, the existing 2014 documentation was of limited use for 
the 2015 harness. To do physical testing, the pin out of the harness had to be determined using 
other methods.   
The first step to determining the pin out was to try to use the existing documentation. As 
described above, the existing documentation had limited usefulness.  Therefore, efforts moved 
onto the second method of trying to find additional existing documentation. A rather extensive 
internet search was initiated, and a member of the WPI student branch of the Society of 
Automotive Engineers (SAE) was contacted to see if they had any resources. The search resulted 
in finding documents about the 2015 Chevy Impala, but they did not go into sufficient detail about 
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the electrical systems to be helpful [30].  The search also resulted in the discovery of a document 
that looked to have the information we needed, but it cost over $500 and was not inside of the 
budget of the project [31]. 
Method 3 was based upon the existing documentation, which was known to be poor.  Even 
though some of the documentation was known to be incorrect, the expectation was at least a few 
of the connections would be accurate, and that it could be used as a starting point from. Using the 
existing documentation, looking only at the connectors with physical pinouts that matched the 
documentation, a continuity tester was used to test each documented connection.  Using this 
method only two pairs of connections were found as can be seen in Figures 27 and 28.  
Figure 27: The CAN high and CAN low connections between the K38 Chassis Control node and 
the K73 X1 Telematics connector forming a two node CAN bus. Pin 6 on the Chassis control 
module pictured at the top left connects to pin 10 on the K73 X1 telematics connector pictured 
on bottom right and makes up the CAN high portion of the bus.  Pin 17 on the K38 Chassis 
Control connector and Pin 12 on the K73 Telematics connector makes up the CAN low 
connection.  
Can High:  Pin 6
Can Low:  Pin 17
K38 Chassis Control
Can High:  Pin 10
Can Low:  Pin 12
K73 X1 - Telematics
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  With the fully accurate documentation exhausted, a fourth method of finding the 
connections was implemented. This used the documentation as a place to start but did not assume 
that it was a hundred percent accurate. This required spending quality time with a continuity tester 
[32]. While based upon documentation, this method was significantly more brute force than 
method three.  One lead of the multi meter would be plugged into a pin on one connector, and the 
other lead of the multi meter would be used to test every pin on a different connector. Once all the 
pins on the second connector had been tested, the first lead would be incremented by 1 pin and the 
Figure 28: The CAN high and CAN low connections between the K83 Brake Control node and 
the K73 X1 Telematics connector forming a two node CAN bus. Pin G on the Brake control 
module pictured at the top left connects to pin 3 on the K73 X1 telematics connector pictured on 
bottom right and makes up the CAN high portion of the bus.  Pin K on the K83 Brake Control 
connector and Pin 4 on the K73 Telematics connector makes up the CAN low connection.  
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process would start over.  To increase efficiency, testing would begin with the pins marked as 
CAN high and CAN low in the documentation. 
According to the 2014 documentation, the first node on one side of the CAN bus was the 
K20 Engine Control Module, which was connected to the Q8 Control Solenoid Valve Assembly. 
The 2014 documentation indicated the same physical pinout as was found on the 2015 harness 
K20 Connector. This did not guarantee that the electrical pinout would match, but it made sense 
to start with the pins listed in the documentation. Unfortunately, the Q8 connector had 
mismatching physical pin layout.  
Since there was more accurate documentation of what the CAN pins should be on the K20 
connector the process started from there, plugging one lead of the multi meter into pin 39 which 
was documented as the CAN high pin. The other lead of the millimeter was used to systematically 
test every pin on the Q8 connector for continuity.  Eventually, it was found that there was a 
connection between K20 pin 39 and Q8 pin 9.  This method was continued to find that the CAN 
low pin 40 on the K20 connector was connected to pin 1 on the Q8 connector. With these two 
connections known, there were three different buses, each with 2 nodes that we could create. 
The next goal was adding a third node to the newest identified two node bus. According to 
the 2014 documentation the next node on the bus was K43 Power Steering. The K43 
documentation did not line up with the physical pin layout of the connector. The documentation 
indicated 10 pins in 2 rows of 5, but the actual connector was a single row of 5 pins. With two 
connectors with unknown pin outs, a brute force method was applied.  The expected results were 
two pins of the five on the Q43 connector being connected to two of the 12 empty pins on the Q8 
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connector. Eventually the expected connections were discovered, and our known CAN bus 
included three nodes. 
Using the same method from nodes 1 through 3, the pins for nodes 4 and 5 were 
determined.  The pinouts for the first five nodes can be seen in Figure 29.  
At this point the method reached a metaphorical wall. The last connector in the chain was 
the pink K9 Body Control Module. There were four body control connectors, and three body 
control connector types in the documentation. All four of the connectors on the harness were 
different, and none of them matched any of the physical pin layouts found in the documentation 
Figure 29: The CAN bus pin out of the 5 node bus.  The K20 Engine Control connector is 
connected to the Q8 Control Solenoid connector. The Q8 Control Solenoid is also connected to 
the K43 Power Steering Connector.  The K43 Power Steering Connector is connected to the K17 
Electronic Brake connector.  Lastly, the K17 Electronic Brake Connector is connected to the K9 
Body Control A connector.    
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as seen in Figure 30. The difficulty of this challenge came from the sheer number of possible 
connections that could have been made. The documentation indicated that there was a connection 
between the K9 Body Control Module and the K74 Human Machine Interface module, but it did 
not indicate how many of the K9 Body Modules were connected to the CAN bus.  Consequently, 
it was possible that the next connection could start on any of the K9 Modules and could end on 
one of the 4 remaining K9 modules or the K74 HMI connector. 
Additionally, because there were only a maximum of four ECUs and the instrument cluster, 
only five nodes were needed on the CAN bus for testing.  Due to the large amount of effort required 
to connect a sixth node and the low increase of helpfulness, the pinout determination of the CAN 
Figure 30: K9 body control modules. There were 4 connectors on the 2015 harness, and 3 
connectors in the 2014 documentation. Given the seven different connectors, none of them 
share a physical layout. 
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harness stopped after determining 5 nodes. The connections determined on the harness can be seen 
in Figure 31. 
The pinout of the CAN bus on the harness had been determined, but the ECUs still 
needed to be wired in. The CAN harness does not use taps off the network, but rather relies on 
K9 (A) Body Control 
K20 Engine Control 
Q8 Control Solenoid 
K43 Power Steering 
K17 Electronic Brake 
K9 (B) Body Control 
K9 (C)Body Control 
K9 (D) Body Control 
K74 HMI 
K38 Chassis Control 
K73 X1 Telemetric 
K73 X2 Telemetric 
K83 Parking Brake 
Figure 31: High level diagram of the connectors on the harness and their known 
connections.  There is a five-node chain, and two different two node chains that do not 
interconnect.  
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the connected ECU to bridge the gap.  This means that each connector on the bus had two CAN 
high pins and two CAN low pins, as can be seen in Figure 32.  
This means that the CAN bus could be terminated at any desired node by simply placing 
a 120 Ω resistor between the CAN high and CAN low pins. However, it also means that every 
connector on the bus had to have a jumper from one CAN high pin to the other and another 
jumper between the two CAN low pins.  As depicted in Figure 33, if any of these jumpers were 
not properly in place, it would have caused a short circuit in the bus and it would not have 
functioned.  
Figure 33: Example of a sort circuit when 2 pins on a connector are not 
bridged.  The harness connector does not automatically bridge the gap 
between the two pins, and so it is up to the device connector to do so. 
Figure 32: Example of CAN pinout in Connector. There are pins 
that are connected to different segments of the CAN low or CAN 
high bus.  
CAN low CAN low 
CAN high CAN high 
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The boards used as ECUs output to a standard DB-9 Connector.  Using the continuity tester 
function of a standard multi meter the connections between the CAN_L and CAN_H pins on the 
PCB and the DB9 Connector were determined. CAN high was located on pin 2 and CAN low was 
located on pin 7 as can be seen in Figure 34. 
The previous MQP team had left DB9 breakouts, which went from female DB9 to male 
pins.  There were two variations of this, the standard breakout and the terminator which were 
labeled as such. Using a multi meter, the pinouts of the breakouts were determined, as can be seen 
in Figures 35 and 36.  
Figure 34: PCB DB9 connector and pinout.  The Can low pin of the PCB is tied to pin 2 and CAN high 
is tied to pin 7.  
CAN low 
CAN high 
1 
6 9 
5 
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Figure 35: The pinout of the standard DB9 breakout. Pin 2 is tied to the green wire, and 
when connected to the device is tied to that device’s CAN low. Pin 7 is tied to the yellow 
wire and when connected to a device, is tied to the CAN high pin. Pin 3 is tied to the black 
wire. 
(Green Wire) 
CAN Low 
CAN High 
(Yellow Wire) 
5 
9 6 
1 
(Black Wire) 
Figure 36: The pinout of the terminator variation of DB9 Breakout.  
There is an internal 120 Ohm resistor between pin 2 and pin 7 but 
otherwise has the same connections as the standard variation.  
(Green Wire) 
CAN Low 
CAN High 
(Yellow Wire) 
5 
9 6 
1 
(Black Wire) 
120 Ω Resistor 
54 
 
The standard variation wires broke out to three wires as seen in Figure 37. On a standard 
connector, one of these wires would go to one of the CAN pins and a second wire would go to the 
second CAN pin of that type.  This effectively acted as the necessary bridge for that connector.   
The terminator variation featured a built in 120 Ω resistor between the CAN high and CAN low 
pins.  However, the connector only had one wire for each pin as seen in Figure 38.  
Figure 37: Photograph of the standard DB9 breakout. Each wire is 
broken out to 3 pins so that the connector can bridge the CAN high and 
CAN low pins on the harness connector.  
DB 9 Connector  
Black Jumper 
Yellow Jumper 
Green Jumper 
Figure 38: Photograph of the terminator DB9 breakout.  Each     wire only 
goes to 1 pin because the internal resistor handles the bridging of the CAN 
High pin to the CAN low pin. 
DB 9 Connector  
Black Jumper 
Yellow Jumper 
Green Jumper 
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So, to connect an ECU to the CAN harness the following steps would be taken: 
1. Determine pinout of harness connector. 
2. Determine if standard or terminated breakout needed. 
3. Plug in the yellow wire of the breakout into the high pin(s) of the connector.  
4. Plug in the green wire of the breakout into the low pin(s) of the connector.  
5. Plug in the DB9 breakout into the ECU DB9 connector.  
Unfortunately, one of the problems discovered during testing was that the pins on the 
breakout cables were not particularly durable. If the pins got bent even a little and an attempt was 
made to bend them back, they would break off.  A quick fix for the connectors was created by 
soldering on a piece of jumper wire to where the pin had broken off as seen in Figure 39. 
Additionally, two DB9 to CAT 5 converters (one male DB9, one female DB9) were 
acquired as shown in Figure 40.  One Connector would plug into the PCB male DB9 Connector, 
and the other would plug into the DB9 breakout.  The two converters could then be linked using a 
Figure 39: Example of a repaired pin on a DB9 
breakout compared to an original pin.  A jumper wire 
was directly soldered to where the pin broke off.  
Repaired 
Original 
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CAT5 cable of any desired length.  This meant that the ECU could be located a manageable 
distance away from the harness connector.  For example, if someone was programming the ECUs 
using a laptop on a table, the ECU could be placed on the table next connected via USB to the 
computer, while simultaneously connected to the CAN harness connector. These did not end up 
being used in testing.  
 
During preliminary testing with the ECUS, the boards were balanced on top of the grate 
holding up the harness. This was not an ideal position as it resulted in a high chance of an ECU 
being knocked off or the cables becoming load bearing. To fix this problem, shelves to hold the 
ECUs were designed and manufactured.   
Using a pair of calipers, the dimensions of the grate and ECU board were taken.  Using 
Solid works, a 3D model of a section of the grate was created as can be seen in Figure 41.  
Figure 40: DB9 to CAT5 converters.  Any CAT5 cable can be inserted to lengthen the distance 
between the harness connector and the ECU. 
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Using the measurements of the ECU board and the grate, a simple shelf was modeled. The 
shelf was made from two pieces, a horizontal piece that held the ECU and a vertical piece that 
acted as a support shown in Figure 42.  Each piece was modeled as a 3D part, and then the two 
parts were combined into an assembly shown in Figure 43.  
 
Figure 41: 3D Solid works 
Model of a section of the grate 
holding up the CAN harness 
Figure 42: Solid Works 3D Model of the first prototype shelf pieces. On the left is the 
supporting piece that rests up against the grate.  The piece on the right is the horizontal 
piece that holds the ECU.  
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Space on WPI’s Washburn Shop’s laser cutter was booked.  Using the laser cutter user 
guide provided by Washburn shops, the files were formatted to be cut out on the laser cutter. They 
were then cut out of nominal 1/8th inch Acrylic. The parts were then taken to the harness for brief 
functionality testing.  At this point in time two problems were discovered: one of the holes was in 
the incorrect spot and there was nothing keeping the entire shelf from just swinging down off the 
supportive grate. 
With these two problems in mind, the shelving unit design was updated as shown in Figures 
44 and 45.  The hole was moved to correct position, and the vertical piece was modified to give 
better rotational support. Once again, the laser cutter was used to cut out the pieces of the shelf. 
The parts were brought back to the lab for preliminary testing. Initially, no major issues were 
discovered, so the remaining three shelves were cut out.  The shelves were then glued together. 
Figure 43: The first prototype shelf assembly and that assembly on the 
grate model.  As can be seen on the left, the pieces fit snuggly together. On 
the right the assembly can be seen as it would be attached to the grate. 
59 
 
It was now that issues were discovered. Although the grate appeared to have nominally the same 
spacing throughout, that was not the case.  This difference in spacing caused it to be difficult to 
Figure 44 The second prototype of the shelf vertical and horizontal pieces. The piece on the left 
shows the updated hole placement, and the piece on the right shows the updated attachment 
mechanism which comes from the back. 
Figure 45 The Solid Works 3D assembly of the second prototype shelf 
and the shelf on the g grate.  On the left the pieces are fit snugly together, 
and on the right the attachment to the grate is demonstrated.  
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install the shelves in some areas because there was not enough room, while in other areas the 
shelves would just fall off because the bars were spaced too far apart.  While the shelfs did have 
issues, they were deemed satisfactory for the purposes of testing.  The ECUs could be mounted to 
the shelves using stand offs and were no longer precariously balanced.  
4.7 Chapter Summary 
The methodology for the development of this project was extensive in the details required 
to create a functional CAN system. The development of the software and hardware for a simple 
CAN network was completed with the use of MITRE supplied ECUs that were programmed for 
specific behavior of the team. With the use of the open source FLEXCAN library and the 
MCP2551 can messages were able to be sent across a simple terminated system. Message 
Figure 46: ECU mounted on a shelving unit attached to the grate. The ECU is attached using 
plastic standoffs and nuts. The shelving unit uses a combination of its own parts, gravity, and 
friction to remain in place. 
61 
 
verification was completed with the use of SHA1 and SHA256 in a complex message receiving 
system. The pinout for a five-node and two-node CAN buses on the harness was determined.  
Shelves to hold the ECUs were also developed.  Using this physical support, the ECUs were able 
to be used in conjunction with the physical CAN harness. After the ECUs were implemented on 
the physical CAN harness the development of the GUI was completed to add additionally visibility 
to the CAN system. The methodology of this project showed the precise development of each 
proposed goal and the details of how each goal changed and was completed as the project went 
on. 
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS 
5.1 Methodology for Obtaining Results 
 The results of this project can most effectively be broken into the following two categories, 
implementation of message security and results from running the complete CAN system with the 
GUI. To obtain the first set of results it was a matter of building a robust test bench that successfully 
rejected messages based on the use of SHA. As seen in our methodology the process was taken 
step by step, setting up each individual ECU and developing the message spoofing attack and 
timing based attack individually. After testing both individual types of attacks we collected 
performance information of the entire CAN system. This process of testing and verifying allowed 
for accurate representation of the results of using SHA to secure a CAN system. 
 Verifying that an attack was mitigated required an understanding of how the attack was 
being implemented and then understanding how the behavior in the CAN system changed under 
the attack. Once the attack and behavior change were observed it was then the process to 
implement a solution to the attack and determine if the behavior is still that of a system under 
attack.  
The first attack to be mitigated by using SHA was an ID message spoofing attack. An ECU 
would send a message with an improper message ID for the data being carried in the CAN message. 
This type of attack was observed to both slow down the CAN system by filling FIFO buffers with 
bad messages but also created strange behavior in the instrument cluster on the CAN system, such 
as warning lights coming on and off or rapidly changing the speedometer without changing the 
RPM. When the message verification process using SHA was implemented and then the attack 
was run again it solved a few of the problems with the ID spoofing attack. The first change in 
63 
 
behavior under message verification was that instrument cluster no longer was displaying false 
information, showing that data with bad message IDs was no longer being saved. The second 
noticeable advancement while running the message verification process was that the number of 
messages processed on a given ECU went up, indicating that using message verification lowered 
the amount of time spent on processing information from bad messages. The use of SHA to secure 
the CAN system against this type of attack proved to be effective at filtering out ID spoofed 
messages and making the system run more efficiently.  
The second attack that was mitigated was the timing-based attack. This attack would copy 
a message sent from an ECU and send the same message bit for bit after a brief time delay. This 
type of attack was shown to create a display error on the instrument cluster, however unlike the ID 
spoofing attack it did not cause any significant delays to the CAN system. To mitigate this attack 
SHA was used with a global based Arduino timer that allowed for the messages to be time stamped. 
While this type of message verification allowed for the display error corrected and the rejected the 
Figure 47: The above diagram displays the process of creating CAN message and sending 
across the CAN system to other ECUs. This process includes creating the message, packing it 
with data and timing signature, and then sending it into the CAN transceiver to be sent to other 
ECUs. 
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delayed attack message, it also caused problems for some low priority messages that took a long 
time to be sent across the CAN system. While the mitigation of this attack caused a few messages 
to be rejected, it did not cause any performance problems with the instrument cluster or the CAN 
system. The use of SHA and global timers to mitigate this timing-based attack was effective when 
rejecting time delayed messages that could cause dangerous behavior.  
 The above diagram shows the process of message packing to ensure the message has the 
proper detail to be properly verified. The first step of this process is to have the ECU create a 
memory space of 19 hex characters. Once the message space has been created the message is 
populated with an ID and the desired data for the message. After all the data values have been 
assigned the message is then sent to the FIFO buffer using the Flexcan library. Once the message 
is queued in the FIFO buffer the system waits until it can send the message across CAN according 
to the ID. Once the message is sent it is saved in the FIFO buffer of all the ECUs to be processed.  
 Before the message is received by other ECUs it needs to be physically transmitted across 
the CAN harness as a CAN High and CAN low message. Figure 48 shows that CAN High and 
CAN Low both have matching digital wave forms that verify each transmission line works as well 
as each ECU sends message properly formatted.  
The next step in verification of a working CAN system was to implement a message being 
sent across CAN with full data values added to the message. Figure 49 displays a full CAN 
message, with an assigned message ID and message data in each section of the message. This was 
important to verify that he system was able to handle the creation of digital waveforms that had 
the accuracy to transmit messages. 
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Figure 49 Real-time image of CAN High and CAN Low transmitting data with full message ID 
And verified message data 
Figure 48 Image of CAN High and CAN Low Signals being verified to match each 
other on the physical harness 
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 The last results of the tests to determine if the CAN transmissions were working properly 
was to send a message from multiple ECUs at the same time. This test was run to determine that 
the message being sent would not overwrite each other and send at times determined by their 
message ID. Figure 50 shows the result of this test where each message is sent at an individual 
time allowing for multiple devices to communicate across the network.  
 The verification that CAN High and CAN Low transmissions were successful and 
followed all the CAN standards was very important to the results of this project. Without the 
verification that the physical CAN network the rest of the results in this project would be under 
Figure 50 Image of multiple messages being sent across CAN High and CAN Low in real-time, 
with each message waiting till the completion of the previous message to send across the 
network based on message ID priority. 
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speculation. Once the system was verified to work properly the results of the attack mitigation 
could be investigated by analyzing the process of a message after it is received by an ECU. 
Figure 51 The figure shows the process of a message after it is received by an 
ECU that is using SHA for the encryption method. The table highlights how a 
message would be rejected first if it does not have a recognized ID for the data. 
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The first step in setting up message verification using SHA was to have the ECU begin to 
create a message digest using SHA. The input to make the message digest is the message ID plus 
an array of bits that show which hex values in the original message were populated, as well as the 
clock the time stamp on the message. Once the message digest is created it is checked against a 
list of stored hash values to determine if the message is valid. The stored hash values are seeded 
with a global timer to have them change based on time. This use of the timer allows for only 
messages that were sent recently to be received. This detailed process is the result of working with 
the developed CAN system to implement the most attack mitigations possible. The next step after 
verifying the process for message verification was to run a test on the network to determine how 
the system was impacted.  
The last results to be observed was the performance impact that using SHA256 to mitigate 
attacks on the CAN system caused. This observation of the performance was measured by running 
two, one-minute tests of the can system. The first test was run without SHA to mitigate attacks to 
determine a control and set a base for what the number of messages sent across the system in a 
minute was. The second test run was implemented with SHA to mitigate attacks and the number 
of messages received and rejected. The first test produced 2,160 messages in the run time and the 
second run produced 2,810 messages, 980 of which were rejected messages and 1,830 were regular 
messages. The observation is that the use of SHA256 to verify messages increased the performance 
of the system by reducing the time each ECU spends processing attacks. 
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Table 5: Table showing results of Total Messages sent across CAN, without and with SHA256 
encryption. The table highlights the total messages received, as well as messages rejected and 
accepted to determine if SHA256 impacts the performance of a CAN system.  
  
Test Messages 
Received 
Messages 
Rejected 
Total Messages Run Time 
Without 
SHA256 
2,160 0 2,160 30:00 minute 
With  
SHA256 
1,830 980 2,810 30:00 minute 
Figure 52 The figure shows the results of a performance test run on SHA256 where a 
system was run with message verification, and without message verification to 
determine significant performance impacts on the system. 
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The two, one-minute tests were run on the can systems while the ECUs ran SHA1 instead 
of using SHA256. These tests were run to see if there was a comparable difference in performance 
between SHA1 and SHA256. Since SHA1 is an older hashing algorithm and uses a bit size output 
of 160 instead of the 256-bit size SHA256 used it is a slightly less secure method. However, the 
smaller bit size output means that SHA1 uses slightly less inscriptions then SHA256 to reach a 
final output. The test showed slightly lower total messages being sent across CAN then the 
SHA256 test. The difference in the number of messages for the SHA1 test and SHA256 test is 
most likely due to human error in stopping the tests at the same time. The number of messages 
received was still close to the number of messages received previously so the limiting factor of the 
message total was the baud rate of the CAN system. The SHA1 implementation of message 
verification also had trouble accepting all the correct messages, rejecting a few properly formatted 
messages because the message was too low of a priority and did not reach the receiving ECU until 
after the timing stamp had expired.  
Figure 53 The figure shows the results of a performance test run on SHA1 where a 
system was run with message verification, and without message verification to 
determine significant performance impacts on the system 
Figure 53: The figure shows the results of a performance test run on SHA1 where a 
system was run with message verification, and without message verification to 
determine significant performance impacts on the system. 
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Table 6: Table showing results of Total Messages sent across CAN, without and with SHA1 
encryption. The table highlights the total messages received, as well as messages rejected and 
accepted to determine if SHA1 impacts the performance of a CAN system.  
Test Messages 
Received 
Messages 
Rejected 
Total Messages Run Time 
Without  
SHA1 
2,080 0 2,080 30:00 minute 
With  
SHA1 
1,790 825 2,615 30:00 minute 
 
5.2 Expected Results 
This project produced some interesting results that did not perfectly align with the expected 
outcome. The expected results of this project were determined by what the goals of the project, 
trying to create a secure CAN system using SHA. The expected results were to have a software 
solution to stop ID spoofing attacks and timing-based attacks. The performance of the CAN system 
was expected to be reduced while running the message verification system. Finally, the use of 
SHA was expected to have a large impact on the resources of a Teensyduino. While these expected 
results were based in research and experience they did end up differing from the completed results 
of this project. 
The first milestone of results was mitigating attacks on a CAN system, and the expected 
results were very similar to the results. Timing based attacks and ID spoofing attacks were both 
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shown to stop successfully sending messages when the SHA solution was implemented. The ECU 
required resources, processing speed and on-board memory, were not impacted as drastically as 
predicted and each ECU had memory to spare for additional programming. The ID spoofing attack 
was mitigated without any odd behavior being created in the CAN system but the implementation 
of SHA to stop timing-based attacks did have some performance errors. Some of the low priority 
messages being sent across CAN would also be rejected because it took the message longer to be 
sent across CAN then the timestamp on the message was valid for. This was not an expected 
outcome for how mitigating the timing-based attack would affect the CAN system. While the 
expected results did differ slightly from the determined outcome the use of SHA to mitigate attacks 
aligned with the project goals to create a secure CAN system. 
The most unexpected result of implementing SHA for securing CAN was a slight 
performance increase on the system. The initial test without SHA was run and 72 messages were 
verified in a minute. The test with SHA received 95 messages total, which was a 31% increase in 
performance. The performance decrease was initially anticipated because of the additional time it 
would take to run the SHA implementation, delaying each message slightly. The performance 
increase happened because the bad message received on the network took less time to process 
when rejected allowing any ECU to process more messages in a smaller period. 
5.3 Challenges 
This project was not without challenges and setbacks that affected the development time 
and results. The first challenge for this project was when MITRE provided us with the hardware 
for each ECU. While receiving the hardware gave an advantage by saving time it also required a 
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significant amount of time to fully understand the hardware. Using time, research and trouble-
shooting of pins provided us with all the information needed about the ECU.  
The next challenge faced was attempting to implement the Flexcan library onto the 
Teensyduino. Implementing this library proved difficult because a secondary Flexcan library was 
defaulted into the Arduino IDE and a custom library had to be created to implement the proper 
version of Flexcan. 
The development of a working CAN system was hindered by hardware restrictions and 
bugs as well. If attempting to use the Teensyduino with the MCP2551 a lower frequency for the 
baud rate was required. While both systems are capable of speeds up to 1 Mb/s together they can 
only communicate at 500 Kb/s. This change in described behavior caused a few problems with 
Figure 54 Real-time signal of Multimode ECU cluster not displaying digital 
waveforms on either CAN High or CAN Low. 
igure 54: e l-ti e si n l f lti e  cl ster t is l yi  i it l 
       . 
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trouble shooting and creating a working CAN system but was quickly resolved after information 
was provided by MITRE about this malfunction.  
Implementing a multiple node CAN system with the instrument cluster also challenged the 
progress of this project. When initially connecting an ECU to the instrument cluster it appeared 
that no messages were being received, and an oscilloscope we had attached to monitor CAN high 
and CAN low was not displaying digital waveforms, as seen in Figure 54. Eventually it was 
discovered that the instrument cluster was not seen to accept the same ID values as referenced in 
an open source tutorial [20]. Correcting the message IDs allowed for the ECU to correctly 
communicate to the instrument cluster and additional ECUs. Additionally, the ringing effect where 
a digital waveform was expected was resolved by recreating the system with smaller connecting 
wires which may have changed the impedance of the system. Overall the challenges faced in the 
project were educational and did not impact the results of the project greatly.  
5.4 Chapter Summary 
 The results of this project show clearly that the use of light weight encryption can be 
implemented into a CAN system without greatly impacting performance or adding large costs to 
a material budget. Challenges faced on this project created delays and sometimes changed the 
behavior of expected software, but each challenge was managed, and individual errors were 
addressed both with the hardware and software. While the results of the project were surprising in 
some cases most of the goals were fulfilled by the reported results. The effective use of SHA on a 
CAN system was seen to mitigate both timing-based attacks and ID spoofing attacks without 
adding additional hardware or reducing the speed at which the CAN system operated, showing 
that use of SHA can secure a CAN network.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENT 
 This chapter finalizes and concludes all information about this project and briefly discusses 
the project and its results. It summarizes the importance of the project, methodology for 
implementation and key points from the results. Time constraints and resource setbacks are also 
acknowledged and recommendations for future work are included. 
 Through the development of this project knowledge was gained on the intricacies of 
security on a CAN bus.  The CAN system is complicated and consists of many different function 
ECUs and implementation of transmission line hardware. The development of a secure CAN 
system was even more complicated with the addition of using SHA algorithms and logical 
processes to ensure message verification. The complete implementation of this project involved 
using the research provided for justification of the project, the development of multiple hardware 
CAN systems as well as the effective use of SHA algorithms on programmed ECUs to emulate 
attacks and the potential mitigation processes.  
 The development of the ECU and SHA algorithms for the use on the CAN system for 
message verification showed to be a very effective process. This process had minimal impact on 
the performance of the CAN system while allowing it to be secured. Since this implementation of 
message verification has no additional hardware components it is possible for the method to be 
implemented at a low cost and without impacting the production lines of modern vehicles.  
 The CAN harness used in this system along with the GUI provided valuable insight into 
the performance of the CAN system. Allowing the results of each test to be observed in real time 
the results were more easily determined to have an effective impact on the system. The 
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development of the CAN system being put onto a physical CAN harness also allowed the test 
benches to provide more accurate feedback since the system then represented a more realistic 
automotive CAN system.  
 The process of completing this project provided valuable insights to the security of CAN 
systems. The implemented use of message verification allowed of specific researched attacks to 
be mitigated. While challenges were faced on this project the success of the using light-weight 
encryption to verify messages proved to be an effective way of adding additional security to the 
system. The results of this project strongly support that uses of encryption on CAN systems, 
specifically SHA, allows for a cheap and robust solution to the growing problem of automotive 
security. The project should be continued through additional research and discover of new types 
of attacks and the continued exploration of what type of encryption will be the most efficient 
solution. Overall this project has highlighted the importance of explorative research in CAN 
security and provides a template for how continued development could provide additional insights 
into the security of CAN systems.  
6.1 Future Work 
 Due to time constraints of the project there are still developments in the project that can be 
made to further the use of encryption to secure CAN systems. These developments include 
developing more vehicle functionality on the CAN, updating ECUs with additional encryption 
methods, continuing to work on mapping the pins on the CAN bus and continuing to predict types 
of attacks that can happen on the CAN bus. 
One important item for future development is determining the pinout for more nodes on 
the CAN bus.  Additional development can also be made in the way that the Harness and ECUs 
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are held. The harness is currently mounted in a configuration that makes it difficult to follow the 
communications path because it circles back in on itself.  The shelfs for the ECUs can also use 
another round of development.   
Another goal for future development is to update the ECUs on the CAN bus to more 
accurately represent parts of the motor and the electrical components. The best step to develop this 
is to either reference old reference tables for CAN codes or by attaching an ECU to an active CAN 
bus and recording the messages. The goal for this future work is to create the most robust test bed 
possible to get the best results on the encryption implementations. 
Future work should also include more investigation into possible encryption methods. 
Continuing to explore encryption methods will not only reinforce the choice of encryption to use 
by providing supporting evidence but will also allow results from multiple methods to be explored, 
ensuring one of the most effective encryption method is used. Ideally both light weight encryption 
and encryption will be explored to widen the range of possible solutions. 
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